Techniques
Sample rules
Eventvwr UAC Bypass
- source: splunk
- technicques:
- T1548.002
- T1548
Description
The following analytic detects an Eventvwr UAC bypass by identifying suspicious registry modifications in the path that Eventvwr.msc references upon execution. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on registry changes and process execution details. This activity is significant because it indicates a potential privilege escalation attempt, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary commands with elevated privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution, persistence, and further compromise of the affected system.
Detection logic
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes BY _time span=1h Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_path Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| join process_guid [
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path="*mscfile\\shell\\open\\command\\*") BY _time span=1h Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid
| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`]
| fields firstTime lastTime dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process registry_key_name registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data process_guid
| where isnotnull(registry_value_data)
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `eventvwr_uac_bypass_filter`