LoFP LoFP / no false positives known. filter as needed.

Techniques

Sample rules

Windows Spearphishing Attachment Onenote Spawn Mshta

Description

The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different malware families (including TA551, AsyncRat, Redline and DCRAT). This detection identifies onenote Office Product spawning mshta.exe. In malicious instances, the command-line of mshta.exe will contain the hta file locally, or a URL to the remote destination. In addition, Threat Research has released a detections identifying suspicious use of mshta.exe. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or mshta.exe will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity.

Detection logic


| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("onenote.exe", "onenotem.exe") `process_mshta` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id 
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` 
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
| `windows_spearphishing_attachment_onenote_spawn_mshta_filter`

Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin

Description

The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different malware families (including TA551, IcedID). This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning bitsadmin.exe. In malicious instances, the command-line of bitsadmin.exe will contain a URL to a remote destination or similar command-line arguments as transfer, Download, priority, Foreground. In addition, Threat Research has released a detections identifying suspicious use of bitsadmin.exe. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or bitsadmin.exe will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity.

Detection logic


| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe","onenote.exe","onenotem.exe","onenoteviewer.exe","onenoteim.exe", "msaccess.exe", "Graph.exe","winproj.exe") `process_bitsadmin` by Processes.dest Processes.user  Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id 
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` 
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
| `office_product_spawning_bitsadmin_filter`

Office Product Spawning MSHTA

Description

The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different malware families (including TA551, IcedID). This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning mshta.exe. In malicious instances, the command-line of mshta.exe will contain the hta file locally, or a URL to the remote destination. In addition, Threat Research has released a detections identifying suspicious use of mshta.exe. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or mshta.exe will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity.

Detection logic


| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe", "onenote.exe","onenotem.exe", "msaccess.exe","Graph.exe","winproj.exe") `process_mshta` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id 
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` 
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
| `office_product_spawning_mshta_filter`

Office Product Spawning CertUtil

Description

The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different malware families (including TA551, IcedID). This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning certutil.exe. In malicious instances, the command-line of certutil.exe will contain a URL to a remote destination. In addition, Threat Research has released a detections identifying suspicious use of certutil.exe. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or certutil.exe will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity.

Detection logic


| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe","onenote.exe","onenotem.exe","onenoteviewer.exe","onenoteim.exe","msaccess.exe", "Graph.exe","winproj.exe") `process_certutil` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id 
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` 
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
| `office_product_spawning_certutil_filter`

Office Product Spawning Wmic

Description

The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by Ursnif malware family. This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning wmic.exe. In malicious instances, the command-line of wmic.exe will contain wmic process call create. In addition, Threat Research has released a detection identifying the use of wmic process call create on the command-line of wmic.exe. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or wmic.exe will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity.

Detection logic


| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe","onenote.exe","onenotem.exe","onenoteviewer.exe","onenoteim.exe","msaccess.exe", "Graph.exe","winproj.exe") `process_wmic` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id 
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` 
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
| `office_product_spawning_wmic_filter`