LoFP LoFP / legitimate but malformed base64, binary structured fields, or unrelated encoded values can match. confirm that the application actually decodes the field before treating this as an exploit attempt. scripts that construct the trigger after receiving the request may not put a literal base64 value on the wire.

Techniques

Sample rules

Zeek HTTP Malformed Base64 Padding

Description

The analytic hunts for an HTTP header, POST body, or URI containing at least one 64-character Base64 block followed by a short padded fragment. This malformed shape can reach a vulnerable Java Base64 decoder, but its presence in traffic alone does not prove that the server decoded it.

Detection logic

(
    `zeek_http_request_headers`
    header_value="*=*"
    truncated=false
)
OR
(
    `zeek_http_post_body`
    body="*=*"
    truncated=false
)
OR
(
    `zeek_http_uri`
    uri IN ("*=*","*%3D*","*%3d*")
)

| eval request_value=case(
      isnotnull(header_value),header_value,
      isnotnull(body),body,
      isnotnull(uri),urldecode(uri)
  ),
  carrier=case(
      isnotnull(header_value),header_name,
      isnotnull(body),"POST body",
      isnotnull(uri),"URI"
  ),
  dest_port=coalesce(dest_port,'id.resp_p'),
  dest=coalesce(dest,dest_ip,'id.resp_h'),
  src=coalesce(src,src_ip,'id.orig_h')


| rex field=request_value "(?<![A-Za-z0-9+/_-])(?<malformed_base64>(?:(?:[A-Za-z0-9+/]{64})+(?:[A-Za-z0-9+/]{0,2}=
|[A-Za-z0-9+/]?==)
|(?:[A-Za-z0-9_-]{64})+(?:[A-Za-z0-9_-]{0,2}=
|[A-Za-z0-9_-]?==)))(?![A-Za-z0-9+/_=-])"


| where isnotnull(malformed_base64)


| stats count
        min(_time) AS firstTime
        max(_time) AS lastTime
        values(carrier) AS carrier
        values(uid) AS zeek_uid
        values(uri) AS uri
        values(body) AS body
        BY src dest dest_port method malformed_base64

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

| `zeek_http_malformed_base64_padding_filter`