LoFP LoFP / it administrators legitimately create taps for users who are locked out or onboarding a new passwordless authentication method. the key differentiators are the actor and timing -- a helpdesk account creating a tap for a user who just reported a lockout is expected; an unfamiliar actor creating a tap outside business hours or for a high-privilege account warrants investigation.

Techniques

Sample rules

Azure AD Temporary Access Pass Created

Description

The following analytic detects the creation of a Temporary Access Pass (TAP) for an Azure AD user. It leverages Azure Active Directory AuditLogs to identify the “Create Temporary Access Pass method for user” operation. TAPs are time-limited passcodes that bypass all authentication requirements including MFA and FIDO2 - an attacker who creates a TAP for a compromised account can sign in from any location without any additional factor. If confirmed malicious, this activity provides an attacker with an unchallenged authentication path into the affected account.

Detection logic

`azure_monitor_aad`
category=AuditLogs
operationName="Create Temporary Access Pass method for user"
properties.result="success"


| rename properties.* as *

| rename initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName as initiatedBy

| rename initiatedBy.app.displayName as initiatedByApp


| eval actor = coalesce(initiatedBy, initiatedByApp)


| rename targetResources{}.userPrincipalName as targetUser

| rename userAgent as user_agent


| fillnull


| stats count min(_time) as firstTime
              max(_time) as lastTime
  BY dest user src vendor_account vendor_product user_agent
     actor targetUser signature


| rename actor as user


| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

| `azure_ad_temporary_access_pass_created_filter`