Techniques
Sample rules
Windows Audit Policy Security Descriptor Tampering via Auditpol
- source: splunk
- technicques:
- T1562.002
Description
The following analytic identifies the execution of auditpol.exe
with the “/set” flag, and “/sd” command-line arguments used to modify the security descriptor of the audit policy. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity can be significant as it indicates potential defense evasion by adversaries or Red Teams, aiming to limit data that can be leveraged for detections and audits. An attacker, can disable certain policy categories from logging and then change the security descriptor in order to restrict access to certain users or application from reverting their changes. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to bypass defenses, and plan further attacks, potentially leading to full machine compromise or lateral movement.
Detection logic
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_auditpol` Processes.process="*/set*" Processes.process="*/sd:*" AND NOT Processes.process="*/?*" by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_audit_policy_security_descriptor_tampering_via_auditpol_filter`
Windows Global Object Access Audit List Cleared Via Auditpol
- source: splunk
- technicques:
- T1562.002
Description
The following analytic identifies the execution of auditpol.exe
with the “/resourceSACL” flag, and either the “/clear” or “/remove” command-line arguments used to remove or clear the global object access audit policy. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity can be significant as it indicates potential defense evasion by adversaries or Red Teams, aiming to limit data that can be leveraged for detections and audits. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to bypass defenses, and plan further attacks, potentially leading to full machine compromise or lateral movement.
Detection logic
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_auditpol` Processes.process="*/resourceSACL*" Processes.process IN ("*/clear*", "*/remove*") AND NOT Processes.process="*/?*" by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_global_object_access_audit_list_cleared_via_auditpol_filter`