LoFP / false positives may be present. tune as needed.

Techniques

• T1059.001
• T1069
• T1069.001
• T1482

Sample rules

Get WMIObject Group Discovery

• source: splunk
• technicques:
  • T1069
  • T1069.001

Description

The following hunting analytic identifies the use of Get-WMIObject Win32_Group being used with PowerShell to identify local groups on the endpoint. \ Typically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \ During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior.

Detection logic

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR processes.process_name=cmd.exe) (Processes.process="*Get-WMIObject*" AND Processes.process="*Win32_Group*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id 
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` 
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`  
| `get_wmiobject_group_discovery_filter`

Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell Script Block

• source: splunk
• technicques:
  • T1482
  • T1059.001

Description

The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all.

This analytic identifies Get-ForestTrust from PowerSploit in order to gather domain trust information. During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.

Detection logic

`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = "*get-foresttrust*" 
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID 
| rename Computer as dest 
| rename UserID as user 
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
| `get_foresttrust_with_powershell_script_block_filter`

Get WMIObject Group Discovery with Script Block Logging

• source: splunk
• technicques:
  • T1069
  • T1069.001

Description

The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all.

This analytic identifies the usage of Get-WMIObject Win32_Group, which is typically used as a way to identify groups on the endpoint. Typically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.

Detection logic

`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = "*Get-WMIObject*" AND ScriptBlockText = "*Win32_Group*" 
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID 
| rename Computer as dest, UserID as user 
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
| `get_wmiobject_group_discovery_with_script_block_logging_filter`

Powershell Get LocalGroup Discovery with Script Block Logging

• source: splunk
• technicques:
  • T1069
  • T1069.001

Description

The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all.

This analytic identifies PowerShell cmdlet - get-localgroup being ran. Typically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.

Detection logic

`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = "*get-localgroup*" 
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText  
| rename Computer as dest, UserID as user 
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
| `powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_with_script_block_logging_filter`

Net Localgroup Discovery

• source: splunk
• technicques:
  • T1069
  • T1069.001

Description

The following hunting analytic will identify the use of localgroup discovery using net localgroup. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior.

Detection logic

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=net.exe OR Processes.process_name=net1.exe (Processes.process="*localgroup*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id 
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` 
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
| `net_localgroup_discovery_filter`

PowerShell Get LocalGroup Discovery

• source: splunk
• technicques:
  • T1069
  • T1069.001

Description

The following hunting analytic identifies the use of get-localgroup being used with PowerShell to identify local groups on the endpoint. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior.

Detection logic

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=cmd.exe) (Processes.process="*get-localgroup*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id 
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` 
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
| `powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_filter`