LoFP LoFP / false positives may be generated by users working out the geographic region where the organizations services or technology is hosted.

Techniques

Sample rules

PingID Mismatch Auth Source and Verification Response

Description

The following analytic identifies discrepancies between the IP address of an authentication event and the IP address of the verification response event, focusing on differences in the originating countries. It leverages JSON logs from PingID, comparing the ‘auth_Country’ and ‘verify_Country’ fields. This activity is significant as it may indicate suspicious sign-in behavior, such as account compromise or unauthorized access attempts. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to bypass authentication mechanisms, potentially leading to unauthorized access to sensitive systems and data.

Detection logic

`pingid` ("result.status" IN ("SUCCESS*","FAIL*","UNSUCCESSFUL*") NOT "result.message" IN ("*pair*","*create*","*delete*")) 
| eval user = upper('actors{}.name'), session_id = 'resources{}.websession', dest = 'resources{}.ipaddress', reason = 'result.message', object = 'resources{}.devicemodel', status = 'result.status' 
| join user session_id [ search `pingid` ("result.status" IN ("POLICY") AND "resources{}.ipaddress"=*) AND "result.message" IN("*Action: Authenticate*","*Action: Approve*","*Action: Allowed*") 
| rex field=result.message "IP Address: (?:N\/A)?(?<policy_ipaddress>.+)?\n" 
| rex field=result.message "Action: (?:N\/A)?(?<signature>.+)?\n" 
| rex field=result.message "Requested Application Name: (?:N\/A)?(?<Requested_Application_Name>.+)?\n" 
| rex field=result.message "Requested Application ID: (?:N\/A)?(?<Requested_Application_ID>.+)?\n" 
| eval user = upper('actors{}.name'), session_id = 'resources{}.websession', src = coalesce('resources{}.ipaddress',policy_ipaddress), app = coalesce(Requested_Application_ID,Requested_Application_Name) 
| fields app, user, session_id, src, signature ] 
| iplocation prefix=auth_ dest 
| iplocation prefix=verify_ src 
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(app) as app values(session_id) as session_id by user, dest, auth_Country, src, verify_Country, object, signature, status, reason 
| where auth_Country != verify_Country 
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
| `pingid_mismatch_auth_source_and_verification_response_filter`