LoFP / automated testing or monitoring tools that do not persist cookies may trigger this rule.

FROM logs-okta.system-* METADATA _id, _version, _index
| WHERE
    event.dataset == "okta.system"
    AND (event.action LIKE "user.authentication.*" OR event.action == "user.session.start")
    AND okta.outcome.reason IN ("INVALID_CREDENTIALS", "LOCKED_OUT")
    AND okta.actor.alternate_id IS NOT NULL
    // Primary authn endpoint; sessions API provides additional coverage
    AND (
        okta.debug_context.debug_data.request_uri == "/api/v1/authn"
        OR okta.debug_context.debug_data.request_uri LIKE "/api/v1/sessions*"
    )
// Track whether each event has a device token
| EVAL has_dt_hash = CASE(okta.debug_context.debug_data.dt_hash IS NOT NULL, 1, 0)
// Aggregate by IP + user to detect single-user brute force
| STATS
    Esql.unique_dt_hashes = COUNT_DISTINCT(okta.debug_context.debug_data.dt_hash),
    Esql.total_attempts = COUNT(*),
    Esql.attempts_with_dt = SUM(has_dt_hash),
    Esql.unique_user_agents = COUNT_DISTINCT(okta.client.user_agent.raw_user_agent),
    Esql.first_seen = MIN(@timestamp),
    Esql.last_seen = MAX(@timestamp),
    Esql.dt_hash_values = VALUES(okta.debug_context.debug_data.dt_hash),
    Esql.event_action_values = VALUES(event.action),
    Esql.user_agent_values = VALUES(okta.client.user_agent.raw_user_agent),
    Esql.device_values = VALUES(okta.client.device),
    Esql.is_proxy_values = VALUES(okta.security_context.is_proxy),
    Esql.geo_country_values = VALUES(client.geo.country_name),
    Esql.geo_city_values = VALUES(client.geo.city_name),
    Esql.source_asn_values = VALUES(source.as.number),
    Esql.source_asn_org_values = VALUES(source.as.organization.name),
    Esql.threat_suspected_values = VALUES(okta.debug_context.debug_data.threat_suspected),
    Esql.risk_level_values = VALUES(okta.debug_context.debug_data.risk_level),
    Esql.risk_reasons_values = VALUES(okta.debug_context.debug_data.risk_reasons)
  BY okta.client.ip, okta.actor.alternate_id
// Calculate automation detection metrics (float-safe division)
| EVAL Esql.dt_coverage = Esql.attempts_with_dt * 1.0 / Esql.total_attempts,
       Esql.dt_per_attempt = Esql.unique_dt_hashes * 1.0 / Esql.total_attempts
// Detection branches:
//   A) Many unique DT hashes relative to attempts = tooling generating new tokens per attempt
//   B) High attempts + very low DT coverage = cookie-less automation (no DT sent at all)
//   C) Multiple user agents for same user = evasion or automation
| WHERE
    (Esql.unique_dt_hashes >= 7 AND Esql.total_attempts >= 10 AND Esql.dt_per_attempt >= 0.5)
    OR (Esql.total_attempts >= 12 AND Esql.dt_coverage < 0.15)
    OR (Esql.total_attempts >= 10 AND Esql.unique_user_agents >= 5)
| SORT Esql.total_attempts DESC
| KEEP Esql.*, okta.client.ip, okta.actor.alternate_id