LoFP / administrators and identity teams may legitimately create or reset console login profiles during user onboarding, password resets, or break-glass procedures. verify the principal in \"aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn\", the target user in \"aws.cloudtrail.request_parameters\", and whether the change aligns with an approved request. known administration roles and provisioning automation can be excluded after validation.

Techniques

• T1098

Sample rules

AWS IAM Login Profile Created or Modified for an IAM User

• source: elastic
• technicques:
  • T1098

Description

Identifies creation or modification of a console login profile for an AWS IAM user via CreateLoginProfile or UpdateLoginProfile. A login profile enables password-based console sign-in for an IAM user. Adversaries who obtain programmatic credentials may create a login profile to add persistent interactive console access, or update an existing profile to reset another user’s password and take over the account, even after the original access keys are rotated. Because console access for IAM users is increasingly provisioned through federation or IAM Identity Center, direct use of these APIs by an unexpected principal warrants review. This rule targets IAM users (the userName parameter is present); creation of a login profile for the account root user is covered by a separate rule.

Detection logic

data_stream.dataset: "aws.cloudtrail"
    and event.provider: "iam.amazonaws.com"
    and event.action: ("CreateLoginProfile" or "UpdateLoginProfile")
    and event.outcome: "success"
    and not aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.type: "AWSService"
    and not user_agent.original: (*terraform* or *pulumi* or *ansible*)
    and not aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn: (*terraform* or *pulumi* or *ansible*)
    and not source.as.organization.name: (Amazon* or AMAZON* or Google*)
    and not source.address: ("cloudformation.amazonaws.com" or "servicecatalog.amazonaws.com")