LoFP LoFP / admin activities or installing related updates may do a sudden stop to list of services we monitor.

Techniques

Sample rules

Known Services Killed by Ransomware

Description

This analytic has been deprecated in favor of a new analytic - Windows Security And Backup Services Stop. The following analytic detects the suspicious termination of known services commonly targeted by ransomware before file encryption. It leverages Windows System Event Logs (EventCode 7036) to identify when critical services such as Volume Shadow Copy, backup, and antivirus services are stopped. This activity is significant because ransomware often disables these services to avoid errors and ensure successful file encryption. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to widespread data encryption, rendering files inaccessible and potentially causing significant operational disruption and data loss.

Detection logic

`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 param1 IN ("*Volume Shadow Copy*","*VSS*", "*backup*", "*sophos*", "*sql*", "*memtas*", "*mepocs*", "*veeam*", "*svc$*", "DefWatch", "ccEvtMgr", "ccSetMgr", "SavRoam", "RTVscan", "QBFCService", "QBIDPService", "Intuit.QuickBooks.FCS", "QBCFMonitorService", "YooBackup", "YooIT", "*Veeam*", "PDVFSService", "BackupExec*", "WdBoot", "WdFilter", "WdNisDrv", "WdNisSvc", "WinDefend", "wscsvc", "Sense", "sppsvc", "SecurityHealthService") param2="stopped" 
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode param1 dest 
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
| `known_services_killed_by_ransomware_filter`

Windows Security And Backup Services Stop

Description

The following analytic detects the suspicious termination of known services commonly targeted by ransomware before file encryption. It leverages Windows System Event Logs (EventCode 7036) to identify when critical services such as Volume Shadow Copy, backup, and antivirus services are stopped. This activity is significant because ransomware often disables these services to avoid errors and ensure successful file encryption. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to widespread data encryption, rendering files inaccessible and potentially causing significant operational disruption and data loss.

Detection logic

`wineventlog_system` `normalized_service_binary_field` 
| rename param1 as display_name 
| where param2="stopped" AND (match(display_name, "(?i)(Volume Shadow Copy
|VSS
|backup
|sophos
|sql
|memtas
|mepocs
|veeam
|svc\$
|DefWatch
|ccEvtMgr
|ccSetMgr
|SavRoam
|RTVscan
|QBFCService
|QBIDPService
|Intuit\.QuickBooks\.FCS
|QBCFMonitorService
|YooBackup
|YooIT
|Veeam
|PDVFSService
|BackupExec
|WdBoot
|WdFilter
|WdNisDrv
|WdNisSvc
|WinDefend
|wscsvc
|Sense
|sppsvc
|SecurityHealthService)") OR match(normalized_service_name, "(?i)(Volume Shadow Copy
|VSS
|backup
|sophos
|sql
|memtas
|mepocs
|veeam
|svc\$
|DefWatch
|ccEvtMgr
|ccSetMgr
|SavRoam
|RTVscan
|QBFCService
|QBIDPService
|Intuit\.QuickBooks\.FCS
|QBCFMonitorService
|YooBackup
|YooIT
|Veeam
|PDVFSService
|BackupExec
|WdBoot
|WdFilter
|WdNisDrv
|WdNisSvc
|WinDefend
|wscsvc
|Sense
|sppsvc
|SecurityHealthService)")) 
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode display_name dest normalized_service_name 
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
| `windows_security_and_backup_services_stop_filter`