LoFP LoFP / active setup installer may add or modify this registry.

Techniques

Sample rules

Windows Audit Policy Auditing Option Modified - Registry

Description

The following analytic detects potentially suspicious modifications to the Audit Policy auditing options registry values. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, focusing on changes to one of the following auditing option values “CrashOnAuditFail”, “FullPrivilegeAuditing”, “AuditBaseObjects” and “AuditBaseDirectories” within the “HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\” registry key. This activity is significant as it could be a sign of a threat actor trying to tamper with the audit policy configuration, and disabling SACLs configuration. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to bypass defenses, and plan further attacks, potentially leading to full machine compromise or lateral movement.

Detection logic


| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE Registry.registry_key_name="*\\Control\\Lsa" Registry.registry_value_name IN ("CrashOnAuditFail", "FullPrivilegeAuditing", "AuditBaseObjects", "AuditBaseDirectories") BY Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.dest Registry.user 
| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` 
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
| `windows_audit_policy_auditing_option_modified___registry_filter`

Active Setup Registry Autostart

Description

The following analytic detects suspicious modifications to the Active Setup registry for persistence and privilege escalation. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, focusing on changes to the “StubPath” value within the “SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components” path. This activity is significant as it is commonly used by malware, adware, and APTs to maintain persistence on compromised machines. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute code upon system startup, potentially leading to further system compromise and unauthorized access.

Detection logic


| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_value_name= "StubPath" Registry.registry_path = "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Active Setup\\Installed Components*") BY Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.dest Registry.user 
| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` 
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `active_setup_registry_autostart_filter`