LoFP LoFP / a user who predominantly uses a passkey can legitimately fall back to a weaker method when their authenticator is unavailable (lost or forgotten security key, new or wiped device, biometric failure). correlate the downgrade session's source ip, geo, asn, user agent, device, and conditional access result with the user's norm, and confirm whether a help-desk or self-service recovery occurred. only meaningful in environments with meaningful passkey adoption.

Techniques

Sample rules

Entra ID Potential Passkey Downgrade

Description

Identifies a Microsoft Entra ID user whose recent fresh authentications are predominantly phishing-resistant (passkey/FIDO2 or Windows Hello for Business) but who then successfully completes a phishable method such as Authenticator push, OATH, SMS, or voice. Adversary-in-the-middle proxies force this downgrade by suppressing the passkey prompt so the victim falls back to a relayable method. Legitimate fallback produces the same pattern, so the alert requires corroboration.

Detection logic

FROM logs-azure.signinlogs-*
| WHERE azure.signinlogs.category == "SignInLogs"
    AND azure.signinlogs.properties.session_id IS NOT NULL
    AND azure.signinlogs.properties.authentication_details IS NOT NULL
    AND azure.signinlogs.properties.user_id IS NOT NULL
    AND azure.signinlogs.properties.user_principal_name IS NOT NULL
    AND azure.signinlogs.properties.tenant_id IS NOT NULL

// Pair each authentication method with its success flag from the flattened authentication_details
| EVAL ad = TO_STRING(azure.signinlogs.properties.authentication_details)
| GROK ad """"authentication_method":%{DATA:method_raw},"authentication_"""
| GROK ad """"succeeded":%{DATA:succeeded_raw}}"""
| EVAL Esql.auth_methods = SPLIT(REPLACE(method_raw, """[\[\]"]""", ""), ","),
       Esql.auth_method_succeeded = SPLIT(REPLACE(succeeded_raw, """[\[\]"]""", ""), ",")
| EVAL Esql.method_outcome_pairs = MV_CONCAT(MV_ZIP(Esql.auth_methods, Esql.auth_method_succeeded, "~"), " || ")

// Flag sessions where a phishing-resistant or a phishable method actually succeeded (passkey/WHfB vs push/OATH/SMS/voice)
| EVAL Esql.resistant_method_success = CASE(
      Esql.method_outcome_pairs LIKE "*Passkey (synced)~true*" OR Esql.method_outcome_pairs LIKE "*Passkey (device-bound)~true*"
      OR Esql.method_outcome_pairs LIKE "*FIDO2 security key~true*" OR Esql.method_outcome_pairs LIKE "*Windows Hello for Business~true*", 1, 0),
    Esql.phishable_method_success = CASE(
      Esql.method_outcome_pairs LIKE "*Mobile app notification~true*" OR Esql.method_outcome_pairs LIKE "*OATH verification code~true*"
      OR Esql.method_outcome_pairs LIKE "*Text message~true*" OR Esql.method_outcome_pairs LIKE "*Voice call~true*", 1, 0)

// A downgrade event is a phishable method succeeding within the recent window
| EVAL Esql.is_downgrade = Esql.phishable_method_success == 1 AND @timestamp >= NOW() - 24 hour

// Aggregate session counts and downgrade-event context by tenant and user
| STATS Esql.total_sessions = COUNT_DISTINCT(azure.signinlogs.properties.session_id),
        Esql.resistant_sessions = COUNT_DISTINCT(CASE(Esql.resistant_method_success == 1, azure.signinlogs.properties.session_id, null)),
        Esql.phishable_sessions = COUNT_DISTINCT(CASE(Esql.phishable_method_success == 1, azure.signinlogs.properties.session_id, null)),
        Esql.baseline_resistant = COUNT_DISTINCT(CASE(Esql.resistant_method_success == 1 AND @timestamp < NOW() - 24 hour, azure.signinlogs.properties.session_id, null)),
        Esql.baseline_phishable = COUNT_DISTINCT(CASE(Esql.phishable_method_success == 1 AND @timestamp < NOW() - 24 hour, azure.signinlogs.properties.session_id, null)),
        Esql.downgrade_session_count = COUNT_DISTINCT(CASE(Esql.is_downgrade, azure.signinlogs.properties.session_id, null)),
        Esql.last_seen = MAX(@timestamp),
        Esql.downgrade_methods = VALUES(CASE(Esql.is_downgrade, Esql.method_outcome_pairs, null)),
        Esql.downgrade_sessions = VALUES(CASE(Esql.is_downgrade, azure.signinlogs.properties.session_id, null)),
        Esql.downgrade_ips = VALUES(CASE(Esql.is_downgrade, source.ip, null)),
        Esql.downgrade_as_orgs = VALUES(CASE(Esql.is_downgrade, source.`as`.organization.name, null)),
        Esql.downgrade_countries = VALUES(CASE(Esql.is_downgrade, source.geo.country_name, null)),
        Esql.downgrade_user_agents = VALUES(CASE(Esql.is_downgrade, user_agent.original, null)),
        Esql.downgrade_device_os = VALUES(CASE(Esql.is_downgrade, azure.signinlogs.properties.device_detail.operating_system, null)),
        Esql.downgrade_apps = VALUES(CASE(Esql.is_downgrade, azure.signinlogs.properties.app_display_name, null)),
        Esql.downgrade_resources = VALUES(CASE(Esql.is_downgrade, azure.signinlogs.properties.resource_display_name, null)),
        Esql.downgrade_client_apps = VALUES(CASE(Esql.is_downgrade, azure.signinlogs.properties.client_app_used, null)),
        Esql.downgrade_ca_status = VALUES(CASE(Esql.is_downgrade, azure.signinlogs.properties.conditional_access_status, null)),
        Esql.downgrade_risk_states = VALUES(CASE(Esql.is_downgrade, azure.signinlogs.properties.risk_state, null)),
        Esql.downgrade_correlation_ids = VALUES(CASE(Esql.is_downgrade, azure.signinlogs.properties.correlation_id, null)),
        Esql.downgrade_outcomes = VALUES(CASE(Esql.is_downgrade, event.outcome, null))
    BY azure.signinlogs.properties.tenant_id, azure.signinlogs.properties.user_principal_name, azure.signinlogs.properties.user_id

// Require a minimum resistant baseline (sessions older than 24h) and at least one recent downgrade
| WHERE Esql.baseline_resistant >= 3 AND Esql.downgrade_session_count >= 1

// Phishing-resistant ratio over the baseline only, so the downgrade session should not dilute it (token-reuse / unresolved sessions excluded)
| EVAL Esql.unknown_sessions = Esql.total_sessions - Esql.phishable_sessions - Esql.resistant_sessions,
       Esql.fresh_auth_sessions = Esql.resistant_sessions + Esql.phishable_sessions,
       Esql.resistant_ratio = Esql.baseline_resistant::double / (Esql.baseline_resistant + Esql.baseline_phishable)

// Keep predominantly phishing-resistant users (>= 90%)
| WHERE Esql.resistant_ratio >= 0.9
| KEEP azure.*, Esql.*